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Abstract 
The adoption of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) by all United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
member states in 2005, and its reaffirmation in dozens of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, indicate 
that there is a growing consensus around the world that egregious human rights violations necessitate a cooperative 
and decisive international response. But just as the political debates raged surrounding the precise articulation of RtoP 
between 2001 and 2005, so too goes the contemporary debate surrounding the implementation of RtoP. Regional 
divergences in RtoP implementation, in particular, have been noted by many scholars, as regional organizations 
implement those elements of RtoP that best suit their policy goals. This paper will apply recent scholarship on norm-
lifecycles, specifically on “norm localization” to the operationalization of RtoP by regional organizations. We seek to 
explore regional divergences on RtoP implementation between the European Union (EU), League of Arab States (LAS), 
and the African Union (AU) on Libya and Syria. From this assessment, three main arguments will be put forward:  
(1) regional organizations remain politicized, reframing RtoP in divergent ways that dilute the strength of the norm,  
(2) politicization of the RtoP discourse constrains regional norm localization processes, (3) politicization and reframing 
of RtoP inhibit regional normative change and limit the potential for timely and decisive responses to protect civilians. 
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1. Introduction 
With the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) in the World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) by the United Nations General Assembly (UN-
GA) member states in 2005, and its reaffirmation in 
multiple UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions since 
2006, scholarly and political debates have shifted from 
a focus on the “what” questions concerning the con-
ceptual parameters of the evolving norm, to the 
“how?” and “under whose authority?” questions sur-
rounding its implementation. Indeed, it is clear that the 
2005 WSOD articulation of RtoP centralized authority 
for sanctioning collective military intervention exclu-
sively within the UNSC. Given the stalemate of the P-5 
member states on Syria following the controversial in-
tervention in Libya by NATO forces in 2011, and even 
though the connection between these two cases and 
the action and inaction taken in turn has been much 
debated (Bellamy, 2014; Morris, 2013), what is clear is 
the extent to which RtoP has become politicized within 
the Security Council. This politicization and subsequent 
inaction has increased pressure on the United Nations 
(UN) to empower regional organizations to take a 
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greater role in implementing RtoP, particularly given 
the unlikely immediate possibility of UNSC reform.  
Regional organizations, however, are not a panacea 
to the challenges of implementing RtoP. As has been 
noted by many scholars, regional organizations often 
face challenges associated with lacking resources and 
capabilities to ensure enforcement of security man-
dates, have adopted divergent and inconsistent man-
dates related to RtoP, and suffer from similar 
deficiencies associated with multilateral decision-
making, including consensus-based (frequently lowest 
common denominator) agreements which overempha-
size rhetorical commitments over the practical re-
sponses to the protection of civilians (Taft & Ladnier, 
2006). Still, the role of regional organizations, particu-
larly in peacekeeping operations, and directing the 
conceptualization of the RtoP principle itself, has been 
argued to convey greater international legitimacy to 
global initiatives on the protection of civilians from 
mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2011; Haugevik, 2009).  
This paper seeks to explore the role of specific re-
gional organizations, namely the European Union (EU), 
the League of Arab States (LAS), and the African Union 
(AU), in responding to mass atrocity crimes in Libya and 
Syria. These organizations have broad mandates that 
include, but are not limited to, security, unlike the 
more restricted security-focused mandate of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  As such, their se-
curity mandates are more likely to be informed by their 
other policy areas, including in the area of human 
rights protection, development, and human security. 
Specifically, this paper seeks to explore whether re-
gional rhetorical commitment and initiatives on RtoP 
have strengthened the international community’s im-
plementation of RtoP, whereby operationalizing the 
concept has meaningfully enhanced regional capacity 
to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.  
2. Background on the Responsibility to Protect 
The RtoP doctrine originated out of the recognized 
need to reconsider the United Nations Charter of 1945 
and shift international norms from a focus on the rights 
of the nation-state to prioritizing the rights of the indi-
vidual. From this, a nuanced debate began regarding 
how the international community could shift from 
“state-based collective security” to “human security”, 
particularly how to align moral authority on issues of in-
terventionism with legal and political legitimacy (Chan-
dler, 2004, p. 60). This debate then spawned discourse 
on understanding the relationship between intervention 
and state sovereignty and creating a new norm address-
ing the parameters for action in the face of mass atroci-
ties, while not diluting the sovereignty of the host state.  
Chandler (2004) asserts that the quest for interna-
tional unity regarding the processes and norms related 
to humanitarian intervention was championed by UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, at the 1999 and 2000 
UN General Assemblies. In response to Annan’s discus-
sion, Jean Chrétien, then Canadian Prime Minister, 
called for the establishment of the International Com-
mission on Interventionism and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) tasked with developing a comprehensive 
framework for legitimizing humanitarian intervention 
(Chandler, 2004). The completion of the project result-
ed in the first use of the term “responsibility to pro-
tect” in a report titled, The Responsibility to Protect, 
which called for 3R—the responsibility to prevent, the 
responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild 
(Chandler, 2010). Published later in 2005, Annan’s re-
port, In Larger Freedom, revised the three pillars of the 
ICISS report, to include the responsibility of the state to 
protect its citizens, international assistance to support 
capacity-building of the state, and timely and decisive 
response by the international community (Chandler, 
2010). A product of the UN World Summit in Septem-
ber 2005, the WSOD included several paragraphs on 
RtoP in line with the modifications authored by Annan, 
and all participating UNGA member states adopted 
them by consensus. 
The core tenant of RtoP doctrine is that each partic-
ipating state bears the responsibility to protect its citi-
zens from mass atrocities, and, in the case that such 
efforts are inadequate, the greater international com-
munity has the responsibility to assist the state with 
this mandate, and in select cases, intervene as a last 
resort (United Nations, 2005). As Paris (2014) high-
lights, the doctrine prioritizes peaceful means of pro-
tection, but also permits the use of coercive force by 
the international community in extreme cases. The var-
iation in potential RtoP cases that could trigger inter-
vention has left it vulnerable to politicization. One main 
argument regarding the weakness of RtoP, champi-
oned by Paris (2014) is the “mixed motives problem.” 
The distinction between altruistic military intervention 
and war is politically pertinent because the responses 
will be different for an operation that aims to protect 
civilians versus an operation that is a “self-interested 
war” (Bachman, 2015; Paris, 2014, p. 572). However, in 
practice, military action almost always has a self-
interested component (Evans, 2004). Nonetheless, 
RtoP still faces structural challenges associated with 
self-interested rather than humanitarian intentions on 
the one hand, and the more significant problem of 
lacking self-interest or political will to protect civilians 
in countries without geopolitical importance to global 
powers on the other. Deadlock at the UNSC in key cas-
es, including on Darfur and Syria, has highlighted these 
challenges, and led to calls for regional organizations to 
take a greater role on RtoP. 
3. Regional Organizations as Collective Security Actors 
The role of regional organizations within global gov-
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ernance, and specifically in supporting international 
peace and security, has a long history. The United Na-
tions Charter refers to the role of regional organiza-
tions under Chapter VIII in Article 52 stating: 
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the ex-
istence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.” (United Nations, 1945, art. 52) 
The Charter also asserts that “The Security Council 
shall encourage the development of pacific settlement 
of local disputes through such regional arrangements 
or by such regional agencies”, while the UNSC can “uti-
lize such regional arrangements or agencies for en-
forcement action under its authority” (United Nations. 
1945, art. 52 & 53). While the founding members to the 
UN positioned the UNSC as the ultimate arbiter of in-
ternational peace and security, they also viewed the role 
of regional organizations and other inter-governmental 
bodies as supporting global governance efforts to ensure 
pacific settlement of disputes and security enforcement 
measures (Haugevik, 2009; Seaman, 2015). As such, re-
gional organizations were positioned to support global 
governance decision-making and implementation 
measures at the highest levels. 
With the ongoing contemporary challenges the 
UNSC has faced in terms of legitimacy in security mat-
ters, as well as in garnering political consensus for 
peace and security enforcement mandates, regional 
organizations have been increasingly relied upon in 
peace support operations. We have observed the Afri-
can Union (AU) operation in Sudan since 2003 (in part-
nership with the UN); the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) operations in Liberia 
and in Sierra Leone in 1990s; and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo in the 1990s, and in Libya in 2011 as examples 
of this growing regional role in implementing global se-
curity mandates. Indeed, as Bures (2006) argues, the 
2004 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change built on the 2000 Brahimi Report on peace-
keeping reform, arguing that Chapter VIII arrange-
ments need to be more heavily relied upon to further 
enhance the UNSC’s capacity to prevent and respond 
to security threats. 
Regional organizations have also been elevated as 
viable security actors that could fill the governance and 
implementation gaps as they arise. The report of the In-
ternational Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty (2001), Responsibility to Protect, in 2001 first 
outlined the role of regional organizations in providing 
early warning on emerging human rights crises arguing 
that “Greater involvement by regional actors with in-
timate local knowledge is also crucial” since “Regional 
actors are usually better placed to understand local 
dynamics” (ICISS, 2001, p. 22). In extreme cases, and as 
a last resort, the ICISS report also advocated for the evo-
cation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, where regional 
organizations can support the enforcement capacity of 
the UNSC (ICISS, 2001, pp. 64). Most controversially, the 
ICISS report argued that if the UNSC could not act in a 
timely manner to protect civilians from mass atrocities, 
the UNGA under the “Unifying for Peace” clause, or re-
gional and/or sub-regional organizations, should take up 
the charge (ICISS, 2001, p. xiii).  
Not all regional organizations are alike, however. As 
Haugevik (2009) has argued, regional organizations dif-
fer significantly in terms of the extent to which they 
possess a formal responsibility to protect civilians, ad-
equate capacities, and sufficient political will to under-
take “soft” and/or “hard” RtoP operations. Additionally, 
regional organizations face some of the same challeng-
es that global organizations do. There can be significant 
obstacles to gaining strong collective mandates due to 
consensus-based decision-making, they frequently rely 
on resources and capacities that are a reflection of a 
single member state’s commitment to regional coop-
eration, and increasingly they can be co-opted by a 
strong state member’s interests and political posturing. 
The challenges they face surrounding consensus, ca-
pacities, and co-option have a significant impact on the 
normative institutionalization of RtoP and its practical 
implementation. 
4. Normative Institutionalization to Operational 
Implementation  
The process through which new ideas, or repackaged 
ones, become standards of practice and behavior in in-
ternational affairs has had more and more attention 
associated with it since the 1990s. Finnemore and Sik-
kink’s (1998) flagship work on processes through which 
ideas become embedded norms—norm life-cycles—
began to map out the process through which norms 
are created or dismissed through discourse and prac-
tice. Contemporary scholarship has largely focused on 
either norm acceptance and institutionalization (Fin-
nemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999) 
or norm contestation and rejection (Wiener, 2008). A 
third branch of burgeoning literature sets aside the ac-
ceptance/rejection dichotomy on normative change 
and focuses upon “norm localization”, where globally 
accepted norms take on a hybrid character combining 
the key characteristics of the global norm with local 
modifications that make them more contextually sali-
ent (Acharya, 2009). What is then key is the framing of 
the norm by either external or internal promoters to 
demonstrate the ways in which it fits into already exist-
ing local normative structures (Payne, 2001). This re-
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framing appears to be taking place in South East Asia 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2012; Honna, 2012; Teitt, 2011) 
but has been less successful in other regions where 
RtoP has been more vociferously contested, including 
the introduction of the Brazilian concept on “responsi-
bility while protecting” (United Nations, 2011a). Here it 
is not the internalization of the norm that is occurring 
but rather a reframing of the norm by external activists 
in an attempt to make it more palatable to regional 
and state actors. What also needs to be further exam-
ined is the extent to which regional organizations 
themselves are politicizing the norm rather than local-
izing the international understanding.  
International norms, such as RtoP, are intended to 
provide a framework of standards by which a state or 
group of states’ behavior will be judged. The implica-
tion is that these norms provide a belief system that 
transcends a specific political or cultural context (Sik-
kink, 1998) and that they provide standards of appro-
priateness and clear legitimation discourses to guide 
the decision making of actors (Dingwerth, 2008). These 
standards of appropriateness, such as the protection of 
civilians for example, then become the primary 
measures of success for the organization.  
As Sunstein (1997) argues, these social norms are 
then enforced through social sanctions. Resistance to 
these norms and the “moral cosmopolitanism” is then 
framed as illegitimate (Acharya, 2004). This was the ar-
gument made in relation to Kosovo, that the interven-
tion was legitimate because of its humanitarian basis 
and that to question this was to question the moral au-
thority of, not only the interveners, but the wider con-
cept of humanitarian action.  
The question of whether RtoP has evolved from an 
idea or principle to a norm in international affairs has 
garnered much attention in recent scholarship (Bella-
my, 2009; Welsh, 2013). Contemporary research, how-
ever, seems to demonstrate a relative consensus that 
RtoP is a burgeoning norm, whose status could be so-
lidified if it becomes a standard of behavior for states 
and interstate organizations on civilian protection. As 
such, scholarship has increasingly shifted the focus 
from questions surrounding the institutionalization of 
RtoP, to inquiries focused more heavily on its opera-
tionalization.  
Since the adoption by the UNGA member states of 
WSOD in 2005, which included three paragraphs on 
RtoP, and UNSC resolution 1973 on Libya sanctioning 
the use of force to protect civilians, greater consensus 
on RtoP as a standard of state behavior on civilian pro-
tection has been reached, even while new areas of 
contestation and redefinition emerge. Recent scholar-
ship has demonstrated that regional normative opera-
tionalization of RtoP is following a process of “norm 
localization” where RtoP is becoming regionalized, 
adopting localized adaptations through its operational-
ization in specific contexts (De Franco & Peen Rodt, 
2015; Dembinski & Schott, 2014; Seaman, 2015). As De 
Franco and Peen Rodt (2015) argue, the institutional 
implementation that occurs once an organization has 
formally accepted a norm “can become a field of con-
testation and explain why norms are sometimes under-
stood differently across or indeed within international 
organizations” (p. 46). The process of developing for-
mal policy and legal mechanisms, or “implementing” 
the norm, creates standards of behavior that facilitate 
assessments of compliance (see Betts & Orchard, 2014; 
De Franco & Peen Rodt, 2015). Moving beyond tracing 
the political discourse or policy development of RtoP, 
recent scholarship has attempted to begin addressing 
its “operational implementation” or reactive practices 
defined by De Franco and Peen Rodt as “the norm’s 
mainstreaming into existing policies and resource allo-
cation” (2015, p. 46). This can begin to shed light on 
the ongoing contestation and rewriting of the norm, as 
well as they ways in which this contestation develops 
into responsive mandates and resources for specific 
crises, including towards Libya and Syria. 
5. European Union  
The European Union has long been argued to be a pro-
gressive institution with significant normative influence 
around the world. It has developed advanced capacity 
in the area of conflict prevention and conflict man-
agement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion where it has sought to position itself as a leader on 
normative and humanitarian issues (Dembinski & 
Schott, 2014; Manners, 2006). As such, its influence 
has local and global implications. 
The EU’s evolving foreign policy orientation has be-
come increasingly human security-focused (Liotta & 
Owen, 2006a). Building on the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS), the 2004 Barcelona report, A Human 
Security Doctrine for Europe, argued that the EU should 
place human security at the core of its foreign policy. 
The Study Group that authored the report argued that, 
“Human security refers to freedom for individuals from 
basic insecurities caused by gross human rights viola-
tions placing the protection of individuals” (Kaldor et 
al., 2004, Executive Summary). The report claimed that 
the EU’s human security doctrine ought to place priori-
ty upon “human rights, clear political authority, multi-
lateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the 
use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of 
force” (Kaldor et al., 2004, Executive Summary). The 
Study group also recommended that a “Human Securi-
ty Response Force” composed of 15,000 men and 
women drawn from both civilian and military institu-
tions be created, as well as “A new legal framework to 
govern both the decision to intervene and operations 
on the ground” (Kaldor et al., 2004, Executive Sum-
mary). The Barcelona Report greatly influenced the 
ways in which human security ideas were more com-
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prehensively incorporated into the 2008 European Se-
curity Strategy (ESS) and within the European Commis-
sion, including on such issues human rights protection, 
responses to human trafficking, and nuclear non-
proliferation (See De Franco & Peen Rodt, 2015; Martin 
& Owen, 2010). 
While taking a decidedly robust position on the 
need for the EU to lead the way on the provision of se-
curity for people inside and outside its geographical 
purview, the Barcelona Report’s articulation of human 
security relates narrowly to situations where individu-
als are under threat of, or actively being targeted by, 
violent repression (Liotta & Owen, 2006a). Additionally, 
the connection between these broad-based human-
focused security activities and RtoP is decidedly absent 
from the EU’s foreign and security policy mandates, in-
cluding those that have adapted to a core human secu-
rity doctrine. The EU has articulated its support for the 
UN’s 2005 WSOD RtoP articulation, reifying the central 
role of the state to protect its citizens, however, it has 
remained extremely reluctant to operationalize the 
norm itself, largely owing to internal political diver-
gences on how or whether to proceed on the imple-
mentation of RtoP (De Franco & Peen Rodt, 2015). 
Dembinski and Schott (2014) argue that while the EU 
has accepted the UN’s approach on RtoP, it has shied 
away from the military intervention aspects outlined in 
pillar III, choosing instead to focus on its reputation as 
a humanitarian organization working towards preven-
tive and rebuilding capacities. Despite the more inter-
ventionist positions of Britain and France in their roles 
as UNSC permanent-5 members, the EU’s smaller 
member-states, such as Finland and Sweden, have held 
decidedly more neutral and non-interventionist pos-
tures on RtoP. Dembinski and Schott (2014) argue that 
the EU has “pruned international norms” to fit its exist-
ing niche activities: 
“we find that the EU acknowledged the R2P after 
this concept has been approved by the World 
Summit and interpreted it in a way that corre-
sponded with the existing European security culture 
and its focus on peace-building and preventive 
measures.” (p. 370) 
5.1. The EU on Libya 
Since the onset of the peaceful political protests in 
Benghazi in February 2011 to oust authoritarian leader 
Muammar Gadaffi in Libya, and the ensuing repression 
of protesters by government forces, the international 
community was thrust into a complex RtoP crisis that 
tested its resolve to meet the commitments it made at 
the UNGA in 2005. There has been much debate about 
the EU’s role in Libya, with some scholars arguing that 
there was divergence between rhetoric and action 
(Gottwald, 2012), while others asserting that the EU 
adapted RtoP to its existing human security mandates 
focused largely on development and crisis manage-
ment (De Franco & Peen Rodt, 2015; Dembinski & 
Schott, 2014). The process of operationalization of 
RtoP in the Libyan case seems to highlight some domi-
nant trends worthy of discussion. 
Firstly, the EU has widely supported actions of the 
UNSC on Libya, including UNSC resolution 1973, while 
preferring to take a more active role in the preventive 
and humanitarian realms it currently operates within. 
Specifically, UN resolution 1973: 
“Authorises member states that have notified the 
secretary-general, acting nationally or through re-
gional organizations or arrangements, and acting in 
co-operation with the secretary-general, to take all 
necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 
of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians.” 
(United Nations, 2011d) 
The European Council released statements support-
ing the UNSC resolution 1973, even though it voted not 
to pursue military intervention. Cleavages amongst its 
member states, notably Britain and France on the in-
tervention side; and Germany and Sweden, as well as 
other smaller countries on the “soft power” non-
interventionist side, revealed divergent perspectives on 
how best to handle the crisis. The EU initially sought 
preventive measures to compel Gadaffi’s regime to re-
linquish its repressive campaign against the Libyan 
people. It pursued diplomatic channels, and released 
statements condemning the repression of peaceful 
demonstrations, and acknowledged its responsibility to 
protect the Libyan people. European Council President, 
Herman Van Rompuy stated “From the beginning of 
the crisis, the European Union was at the forefront: the 
first to impose tough sanctions; the first to impose a 
travel ban on leading figures in the regime; the first to 
freeze Libyan assets; the first to recognise the Interim 
Transitional National Council as a valid interlocutor” (See 
Van Rompuy, in Rettman, 2011). Van Rompuy even went 
so far as to argue that the EU facilitated the military air-
strikes undertaken by the UK, France, and Belgium un-
der NATO and UN auspices (Rettman, 2011).  
Secondly, as critics argue, the EU did not adequate-
ly apply the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) included in the Lisbon Treaty to the Libyan con-
flict, and instead, played a diluted role (Faleg, 2013). 
Due to a lack of consensus among EU member states 
on its role in “hard power” military interventions for 
RtoP cases, there remains significant debate about 
whether the reputation of the EU as a humanitarian, 
soft-power, and development-oriented institution 
meshes with its potential role as a military interven-
tionist regional organization. Indeed, the history of Eu-
ropean colonization and conflict has highlighted the 
reluctance of some EU members to contravene the 
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non-interference principle until preventive and diplo-
matic means have been more thoroughly exhausted. 
The dilemma, however, remains salient when faced 
with populations enduring serious human rights viola-
tions where, as in the case of Libya, the perpetrators 
are the government leaders themselves. The EU will 
have to find a thoughtful way to adapt its preventive 
and crisis management lean, with its commitment to 
upholding and protecting human rights in RtoP cases. 
Otherwise, its state-centric orientation to RtoP will be 
analytically incoherent with its human security-
oriented policy approach. 
5.2. The EU on Syria 
What began as peaceful protests in March 2011 in Syr-
ia on the tail-end of the Arab Spring movement for 
democratic revolution across the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), quickly turned into one of the 
most significant humanitarian crises since WWII. With 
470,000 dead, and over 12 million people both inter-
nally displaced and fleeing across borders, the Syrian 
civil war between the Assad government and opposi-
tion forces, and Daesh (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
or ISIS) terrorism and territorial expansion has provid-
ed a recipe for disaster. The international community 
has largely been ineffective in its attempts to respond 
to the crisis, or mitigate the violence against civilians. 
Moreover, the international community, and the EU in 
particular, have demonstrated an incoherent posture 
regarding the influx of refugees fleeing the country and 
seeking asylum in Europe. 
It is widely known that UNSC deadlock between the 
US, UK, and France on one side, and China and Russia 
on the other has forestalled any major attempt at mili-
tary action in Syria to end the conflict and address the 
humanitarian crises. The reluctance on the part of Chi-
na and Russia to support any proposed military 
measures in Syria is a reflection of their concerns with 
the “mission creep” that occurred in Libya after the 
NATO led airstrikes sanctioned by UNSC resolution 
1973. While the UNSC resolution affirmed the use of 
force to protect civilians, it did not afford the authority 
to the UNSC to pursue regime change. The toppling of 
the Gadaffi regime was argued to have surpassed the 
mandate of resolution 1973. China and Russia tacit ac-
ceptance of the civilian protection mandate in Libya 
was soured, and has led to a concerted effort to block 
any UNSC resolutions on Syria that make reference to 
the use of force, or the removal of Assad from power. 
The EU’s response to the conflict in Syria included 
$3.5 million in humanitarian assistance funding, and 
the imposition of economic sanctions (Pierini, 2014). 
These efforts had little effect on stemming the vio-
lence, or compelling any shift in approach by the Assad 
regime. Germany, the UK, and France remained active 
members of the “Friends of Syria” group within the UN, 
however, Germany was staunchly opposed to military 
action, and the UK limited its support for robust mili-
tary action to supporting US-led operations. With the 
only operational support for US operations coming 
from France, the Syrian conflict was perceived as a 
proxy war between the US and Russia (Pierini, 2014). 
The Daesh (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or ISIS) 
expansion into Syria, and their onslaught against civil-
ians has increased the human rights violations in Syria, 
and intensified the humanitarian crisis. The flow of in-
ternally displaced people (IDPs), and refugees moving 
through Turkey and seeking asylum in Europe is argued 
to constitute the greatest humanitarian crisis since 
WWII. The EU’s failure to develop unified policy to ad-
dress refugee flows has prompted Amelia Hadfield and 
Andrej Zwitter (2015, p. 129) to argue that, “Political 
responses to the crises within the Union have accord-
ingly been largely crafted on national, rather than Un-
ion perspectives.” The UK has framed the issue as a 
potential burden on its welfare system, while France 
and Germany have asserted that refugees contribute 
greatly to the welfare and economic systems that they 
enter into (Hadfield & Zwitter, 2015). Hungary, notably 
one of the staunchest opposers of accepting refugees 
from Syria, has framed Syrian refugees as aggressors, 
bringing threats of Muslim terror into Europe (Hadfield 
& Zwitter, 2015).  
Despite the European Commission President, 
Claude Juncker’s, attempt to reframe the EU’s position 
in light of its own historical legacy—many Europeans 
descend themselves from refugees—in accordance 
with the 1911 Refugee Convention which grants the 
right of those fleeing persecution to seek asylum else-
where, there has been little unification across EU 
member states on addressing the refugee crisis. The 
result has been a contrary practice to the international 
human rights and humanitarian norms that the EU es-
pouses. Indeed, while the EU’s division on RtoP—
particularly the military enforcement measures—is un-
surprising, its inability to unify around broad-based 
human security norms, such as protecting and ensuring 
safe passage for refugees fleeing conflict is testament 
to its inability to collectively operationalize “soft” 
norms. As Hadfield and Zwitter (2015, p. 131) assert 
that despite efforts to create a European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP), which would unify the region and its 
foreign responsibilities, and broaden adoption of inter-
national legal norms, “a combination of cultural speci-
ficity preventing a common interpretation of those 
norms, and national and fundamental upsurges inhibit-
ing their implementation has marked the region.” Di-
vergences within the EU on operationalizing RtoP and 
softer norms related to human security, such as facili-
tating refugee flows, demonstrate the disconnect be-
tween rhetoric and action and serve as a roadblock to 
effective humanitarian intervention.  
In both cases, the EU has modified the norm of 
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RtoP to fit with its existing prevention-focused humani-
tarian mandate. While the process of norm localization 
requires the inclusion of the new norm within existing 
mandates, there is a lingering question surrounding the 
extent to which the RtoP norm has sparked any 
marked change in the operations of the EU when faced 
with human rights abuses against civilians. What’s new 
about the EU’s practice in RtoP cases? In Libya, the EU 
sought not to apply its CSDP to assist the US-led NATO 
military operation to protect civilians, opting instead to 
focus on its crisis management and development capa-
bilities. In Syria, the EU remained divided in whether to 
push for more robust action, particularly amongst 
those members who also hold positions in the UNSC. 
Even more striking, the EU has not adequately ad-
dressed a “soft” crisis resulting largely from conflicts in 
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq which lies within human se-
curity mandates that are well-established, even if they 
are outside the RtoP normative frame. EU member 
states have evoked highly politicized arguments to 
constrain the EU on issues of military action, limiting 
the organization’s ability to pursue more comprehen-
sive and robust regional responses.  
6. The League of Arab States (LAS) 
The League of Arab States (LAS), more commonly re-
ferred to as the Arab League, is not a regional organiza-
tion noted for interventionism. Founded in 1945 the LAS 
is based on a loosely binding pact designed to improve 
coordination on matters of common interest. The found-
ing members also rejected violence as a means of resolv-
ing disputes, and in 1950 signed the Treaty of Joint 
Defence, determining an act of aggression against one 
member state as an act of aggression against all.  
In 2004, the Council of the LAS adopted the Arab 
Human Rights Charter, which came into effect in 2008, 
and was part of a larger series of reforms of the LAS in-
cluding the introduction of a peace and security council 
and the establishment of an interim Arab parliament. 
These reforms, whilst important, have not resolved 
underlying issues with the structure of the LAS, particu-
larly in relation to the non- binding nature of many of 
the votes. Under the LAS charter only a unanimous 
vote binds all member states, a majority vote only 
binds those states that voted in favor of the resolution 
(Aljaghoub, Aljazy, & Bydoon, 2013, p. 292). This voting 
structure has limited the ability of the LAS to respond 
to challenges where the preferences of member states 
are not aligned.  
Following the ‘Arab Spring’ however crises in the 
region have spurred the LAS into more direct action 
leading to what some commenters are calling a para-
digm shift within the region (Nuruzzaman, 2015). This 
shift was most clearly demonstrated by the Arab 
League’s support for the UN Security Council Resolution 
1973 on intervention in Libya. The support for this reso-
lution, which was the first time the Security Council has 
authorized the use of force for humanitarian protec-
tion against the wishes of a functioning state, could be 
seen as an indication of the growing acceptance of the 
norm of RtoP in the region, particularly when coupled 
with the fact that every member of the LAS voted in fa-
vor of the WSOD in 2005 and actively participated in the 
discussions surrounding the meaning, definition and 
scope of the normative description outlined in para-
graphs 138 and 139. Questions as to the extent of this 
acceptance are however raised with the selectivity in the 
application of the norm in relation to regional crises, 
most notably the response to Syria where reference to 
RtoP by the LAS was conspicuously absent.  
The question then becomes whether support for an 
intervention based on explicit reference to RtoP 
demonstrates a wholesale acceptance of the norm it-
self (Bin Talal & Schwarz, 2013). Perhaps we are in-
stead seeing a form of norm localization within the LAS 
where in response to the situations in both Libya and 
Syria the LAS is adding new insights to the debate 
around the global development of RtoP. For example, 
the Saudi Foreign Minister has suggested that respon-
sibility involves arming the Syrian opposition (Khaleej 
Times Online, 2012) whilst other Arab states have in-
terpreted the concept of RtoP as their responsibility to 
provide humanitarian aid and shelter to Syrian refu-
gees (Bin Talal & Schwarz, 2013), these suggestions fall 
outside of the WSOD description and open up more 
questions about the role of regional actors in adapting 
and localizing international norms and the acceptance 
of RtoP as outlined in the WSOD paragraphs.  
6.1. The LAS on Libya 
The LAS was quick to respond to the repressive actions 
of the Libyan state, following the peaceful protests 
prompted in part by the self-immolation of Mohammed 
Bouazizi in Tunisia on 17 December 2010, the trigger 
event for much of the “Arab Spring”. The membership of 
Libya was suspended on the 22nd of February 2011 and 
on the 12th of March the LAS called for the implemen-
tation of a no-fly zone over Libya, in direct response to 
the threats issued by Gaddafi against the city of Ben-
ghazi (Leiby & Mansour, 2011). The support of the LAS 
for a no fly zone was seen by many as a requirement 
for the adoption of resolution 1973 and as Dembinski 
and Reinhold (2011, p. 7) argue “tipped the balance in 
favor of those who had argued for the imposition of 
coercive measures.” 
The request of the LAS coupled with the participa-
tion of two of its member states in the coalition in-
volved in the no fly zone, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates, prompted by what Bellamy refers to as the 
“al-jazeera effect” (Bellamy, 2011), provided the legit-
imacy and support which was necessary to avoid a veto 
by either Russia or China in the Security Council. In fact 
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“The role of the Arab League in both calling for and 
supporting the intervention provided a veneer of re-
gional legitimacy to a situation that was hotly contest-
ed by other regional actors, including the AU” (Seaman, 
2015, p. 68). What is less clear are the reasons why the 
LAS utilized the frame of RtoP in reference to the Liby-
an situation which directly encouraged international in-
tervention, rather than framing it as an emerging civil 
war which would have tempered the international re-
sponse.  
Throughout the crisis the LAS made direct reference 
to the RtoP obligations of the Security Council including 
in its statement on March 12th 2011 as well as focusing 
directly on the need to protect the civilian populations 
within Libya (League of Arab States, 2011). It is also in-
teresting to note that in the text of resolution 1973 the 
UN Security Council made explicit reference to the 
need for any state taking action to consult with not on-
ly the UN Security Council but also the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Arab League (United Nations, 2011d). The 
resolution also made direct reference to the condem-
nation of Libya by the LAS and the call for a no fly zone, 
bolstering the legitimacy of the actions being author-
ized at an international level with regional support.  
For some the intervention in Libya represents an 
ideal test case for the use of RtoP, with resolution 1973 
affirming all three pillars of the norm, the importance 
of a state’s responsibility to protect its populations 
highlighted by the failure of the Libyan state to protect 
its own citizens pillar one, the attempts by the interna-
tional community to encourage the Libyan state to ful-
fill its obligations pillar two, and the action taken by the 
international community when the Libyan state failed 
to do so, pillar three (William & Bellamy, 2012). The 
success of RtoP was however soon questioned with the 
limited international response to the developing crisis 
in Syria.  
6.2. The LAS on Syria  
In response to the actions of the Syrian government 
against its population, the LAS took a much more cau-
tious approach. This reticence in calling for action or in-
tervention can in part be attributed to the outcomes of 
the NATO intervention in Libya and the perception that 
the operation overstepped its boundaries. The limited 
response can also be attributed to the limitations of 
the voting patterns explored earlier, and is a clear 
demonstration that when there are internal divisions 
within the LAS or when the preferences of all member 
states do not converge around a single issue, then ac-
tions are limited. In its initial response, the LAS made 
no explicit reference to the RtoP, in direct contradic-
tion to its earlier response to the crisis in Libya.  
As the crisis developed, the LAS suspended Syria’s 
membership in November 2011 and then moved to 
sponsor a peace plan in December of the same year. 
This plan included establishing a monitoring mission 
within Syria, in order to observe the compliance of the 
Syrian government. However, as the violence contin-
ued to escalate the mission was withdrawn in January 
2012 and in February the LAS stopped cooperating 
with the Syrian government after Assad rejected the 
proposed joint Arab League United Nations peacekeep-
ing operation. Once this plan was rejected, the LAS and 
UN appointed Kofi Annan as their joint special envoy. 
He introduced a six-point peace plan, which rested on 
the implementation of a ceasefire beginning in April 
2012. When this failed to materialize and after a further 
five months of limited progress, Annan announced his 
resignation as envoy, citing the ‘destructive competition’ 
between Russia and the other permanent members of 
the Security Council (The Guardian, 2012). The failure of 
the Annan peace plan highlights not only the importance 
of unity of purpose at the regional level but also at the 
international level if success is to be achieved.  
The divisions within the LAS have worsened over 
time with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf states 
openly backing the rebels, while others such as Algeria 
and Iraq maintain support for Assad. In the case of Syr-
ia, “The Arab League's role has become a drag because 
of the divisions,” said one well-placed source. “It's not 
an asset but a hindrance” (The Guardian, 2014). The 
continued tensions within the organization, and the UN 
Security Council also led to the resignation of another 
joint Special Envoy, Lakdhar Brahimi in 2014, who had 
threatened to resign almost from the beginning of his 
mission in 2012. Despite the recognition by some 
members of the LAS, such as Saudi Arabia, that they 
have a moral responsibility to intervene and to protect 
civilians, it is clear that the continued lack of unity be-
tween member states has been a stumbling block in 
forging a comprehensive solution to the Syrian Crisis 
(Gulf News, 2011). When coupled with the limited 
agreement at the international level and the perpetual 
vetoes by Russia and China in the Security Council the 
inconsistency and selectivity in the application and im-
plementation of RtoP is made abundantly clear.  
7. The African Union (AU) 
As the continent that has hosted the most cases of 
humanitarian interventionism, Africa has a complex 
and unique relationship with interventionism, which is 
evident in the history of the African Union (AU). In 
2002, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) disband-
ed and the AU was established, largely out of a necessi-
ty to better respond to the human rights violations 
occurring throughout the continent (Sarkin, 2010). UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan recognised this need for 
reform in his Millennium Report to the UN General As-
sembly, in which he cited the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
as one of the key cases demonstrating a need for the 
international community to rethink its stance on hu-
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manitarian intervention (United Nations, 2000). An-
nan’s speech eventually led to the formulation of RtoP 
at the 2005 UN World Summit (Sarkin & Paterson, 
2010), and as such, RtoP is viewed as having African 
roots (Luck, 2008; Seaman, 2015).  
The AU has affirmed its rhetorical support for RtoP 
in the last decade and has adopted a more interven-
tionist stance. Due to the AU’s Constitutive Act and the 
establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), 
which handles issues related to RtoP, Africa’s peace 
and security architecture “is arguably the closest insti-
tutional embodiment of RtoP’s three pillar structure” 
(Williams, 2009, p. 400). While the AU’s Constitutive 
Act does not use the language of RtoP, its principles re-
semble those of RtoP, specifically Article 4(h), which 
grants AU members the right to intervene under cer-
tain circumstances:  
“(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Mem-
ber State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” 
(African Union, 2001) 
However, critics of the AU’s commitment to RtoP 
argue that there is divergence between the AU’s rheto-
ric and action around the doctrine. Murithi (2012), 
Sarkin (2010) and Williams (2009), argue that the AU 
has not resolutely accepted RtoP and the WSOD be-
cause member states are concerned with threats to na-
tional sovereignty. During the 2005 World Summit, 
Zimbabwe’s President, Robert Mugabe, expressed con-
cern that a few powerful states would dictate the 
agenda of RtoP (Williams, 2009). Similarly, Murithi 
(2012, p. 662) writes that a key debate in the AU’s dia-
logue on RtoP is whether or not the AU should “be-
come the primary agent of humanitarian intervention” 
in Africa or whether that role should continue to be 
filled by foreign actors.  
Another divergence between acceptance of RtoP in 
theory versus practice stems from a lack of consensus 
among member states. Many AU members lack politi-
cal will and do not agree on how and when RtoP should 
be implemented (Williams, 2009). This division was ev-
ident in the case of Libya when AU members spilt the 
vote on Resolution 1973 (United Nations, 2011b). 
7.1. The AU on Libya 
From the outset, the AU was reluctant to intervene in 
the protests in Benghazi against Libyan leader Muam-
mar Gadaffi in 2011, and the AU’s failure to develop a 
coherent, unified response to the crisis resulted in di-
minished regional and global legitimacy of the organi-
sation. Lack of coherence was most evident in in the 
AU’s response to UN Resolution 1973, granted approv-
al of a no-fly zone when “three African non-permanent 
members of the UNSC (Gabon, Nigeria, and South Afri-
ca) voted in favour” of the Resolution (Seaman, 2015, 
p. 68). Regarding RtoP, three main positions were 
forged by AU member states: one group, led by Ugan-
da, South Africa, and Kenya, accepted Resolution 1973, 
but claimed that NATO’s actions exceeded the bounds 
of the resolution; another group, championed by 
Rwanda, fully supported military intervention; and the 
third group, headed by Zimbabwe and Algeria opposed 
intervention because they viewed it as a ploy by west-
ern countries to remove Gadaffi from power an insti-
tute regime change (Kasaija, 2013). In response to the 
AU’s ambivalence, the UN made the unilateral decision 
that Libya was an Arab state, not an African one, and 
that the “AU had no authority over North Africa” (Ka-
saija, 2013, p. 127).  
Rather than supporting military intervention on the 
grounds of the doctrine of RtoP and the AU’s Constitu-
tive Act, the AU forged a diplomatic solution involving 
negotiations and settlements. On March 10, 2011 the 
AU’s Peace and Security Council met and proposed the 
creation of an ad-hoc committee of Heads of State to 
negotiate with Gadaffi and the political leaders of the 
rebel group, known as the National Transitional Council 
(NTC), in hopes that a group of high level leaders would 
possess enough clout to rally the support of the inter-
national community (Dewaal, 2012). The AU’s peace 
settlement called for a ceasefire, delivery of humani-
tarian aid, protection of foreign nationals, a dialogue 
between rebels and the government, and an end to 
NATO’s airstrikes (BBC, 2011). The peace settlement 
was received in two markedly different ways: Gadaffi 
accepted the proposal, but the National Transitional 
Council (NTC) in Libya rejected it on the grounds that 
the deal had zero provision regarding the ousting of 
Gadaffi (Adams, 2012; BBC, 2011).  
The case of Libya highlights an overarching criticism 
of the AU: that the AU does not act as a collective 
body, as indicated by the tendency of member coun-
tries to “adopt positions that best serve their interests” 
(Murithi, 2012, p. 667). The NTC criticized the AU for 
doing just that:  
“The NTC saw the AU, whose secretariat received 
substantial funding from Libya, as protecting Qad-
dafi’s interests. They were especially sceptical given 
that two members of the delegation, President Ja-
cob Zuma of South Africa and President Yoweri Mu-
seveni of Uganda, had already publicly criticized the 
NATO-led intervention.” (Adams, 2012, p. 9) 
The AU’s diplomatic approach alone does not war-
rant its de-legitimization, but the AU’s failure to devel-
op a cohesive plan does and, perhaps, if the AU would 
have been able to convince the LAS or NATO to re-
spond peacefully rather than with force, escalation of 
the Libyan conflict could have been avoided. However, 
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due, in part, to misunderstandings around RtoP, the 
case of Libya highlights regional divergence on RtoP. 
The EU, LAS, and the AU each responded differently to 
the Libyan crisis, as a result of divergence in the views 
of member states regarding the implementation of 
RtoP, and differing regional interests. In the case of 
Libya, such divergence resulted in unintended conse-
quences, which should facilitate a re-thinking about 
how RtoP should be implemented and the role of re-
gional organisations in that implementation.  
7.2. The AU on Syria 
As the uprisings of the Arab Spring began to plateau at 
the end of 2011, a new series of protests began in Syr-
ia, which quickly escalated into the one of the worst 
contemporary humanitarian crises. The AU’s proposed 
response to the Syrian crises was markedly similar to 
its response in Syria: negotiated peaceful resolution. In 
conjunction with Russia and China, the AU, especially 
Uganda and Ethiopia, expressed concern that foreign 
intervention could exacerbate the conflict, as it did in 
Libya, and thus advocated for no foreign military inter-
vention (Interfax, 2012). While the language of RtoP 
was not prominent in the AU’s remarks on Syria, the 
African Forum’s Statement on the situation in Syria 
(2013) did refer to RtoP in its call for the AU to act 
peacefully and adhere to international law.  
The AU’s largely non-interventionist stance on Syria 
may stem from the fact that Africa has hosted more 
cases of humanitarian intervention than any other con-
tinent, and its leaders have experienced, first-hand, the 
counteractive effects that unilateral interventionism 
can have on people and countries who are already sub-
ject to severe suffering. Additionally, Tom Wheeler of 
the South African Institute of International Affairs said 
that the AU had no compelling reason to get involved 
in the events of Syria, especially considering the more 
localized unrest that was occurring in Egypt in 2013 
and, more recently, in Burundi (Powell, 2013).  
The case of Syria also demonstrates the lack of 
credibility that the AU possesses in the global arena. In 
an address to the 70th Session of the UN General As-
sembly in September 2015, President Mugabe of Zim-
babwe said that the situation in Syria could have been 
prevented if non-interference had occurred and if the 
UN acted as a multilateral institution by including and 
respecting regional organisations such as the AU 
(NewsdzeZimbabwe, 2015).  
Even though the AU accepts the tenants of RtoP in 
theory, it has failed on multiple occasions to opera-
tionalize the doctrine, and this failure presents obsta-
cles to efficient and appropriate intervention, 
especially in cases such as Syria, where the massive 
flows of refugees and IDPs throughout the region have 
resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis since WWII. 
Whether regional organisations, and their member 
countries, choose to frame the migration crisis as a 
threat to national security, or as a humanitarian crisis 
that calls for comprehensive and cohesive reaction, can 
have a profound impact on the region’s stability.  
António Guterres, United Nations Commissioner for 
Refugees, addressed the consequences that the dire 
situation in Syria has on neighbouring countries, espe-
cially Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt (2014). 
While African countries, other than Egypt, are not host-
ing Syrian refugees, the economic and security threats of 
the massive displacement still reverberate throughout 
the African continent. In his remarks, Guterres asserts 
that crises of this scale do not have a solely humanitari-
an solution, but rather, the solution must be of a politi-
cal nature, forged by the world’s political leaders.  
8. Conclusion 
Regional organizations do play important roles in glob-
al governance on RtoP. We have seen that they can 
provide support to various preventative and responsive 
measures when faced with severe humanitarian crises. 
They have largely supported the UNGA’s articulation of 
RtoP, playing the role of “regional contractor” when 
engaged in active roles under UN auspices. 
RtoP within the regional context has been articulat-
ed in a number of ways, and while we see greater ref-
erence to the protection of civilians in the rhetorical 
sense, we often see a reframing of the RtoP norm that 
dilutes and constrains processes of norm localization, 
and inhibits normative change. The operationalization 
of this burgeoning norm does not appear to convey any 
greater regional responsibility to protect civilians than 
well-established regional norms.  
Even more striking, however, is the lack of consen-
sus and capacity to adequately address human security 
threats more broadly, such as the refugee crisis, which 
do not require consideration of military force. This 
sheds light on the lack consensus on more firmly estab-
lished norms and mandates that are in line with tradi-
tional regional mandates within and outside their 
geographic areas of interest. 
Regional organizations will only be capable of tak-
ing up the operationalization and implementation side 
of RtoP, and human security more broadly, if they can 
garner greater consensus on their policies vis a vis hu-
manitarian crises, and develop national policies that 
are aligned with regional rhetoric.  
Additionally, norm localization processes must 
maintain the core tenants of RtoP, and lead to measur-
able normative change, where the protection of civilians 
is an actionable outcome by regional organizations. Po-
liticization and reframing of the norm of RtoP away 
from its core human-centered focus on protection will 
largely inhibit progress on implementation, and erode 
the international community’s potential to actually 
save lives in RtoP cases. 
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